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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the discovery of the causative agent of AIDS in 1983,2 a massive
international research effort has been directed toward development of a
vaccine to prevent this deadly infectious disease.3 Nearly ten years later, a
vaccinehas notyet been licensed. Progress toward the introduction of a vaccine
has been hampered by several factors such as the complexity of the
disease-causing organism, HIV4 and the lack of a satisfactory animal model in
which to conduct studies. 5 In spite of these technical impediments, the
contributions of numerous laboratories have produced at least some hope. Two
vaccines are now entering Phase II clinical trials.6 Furthermore, there is
2 F. Barre-Sinoussi et al., Isolation of a T-Lymphotropic Virus from a Patient at Risk for
AIDS, 220 Sc. 868 (1983).
3 See generally AIDS VACCINE RESEARCH AND CLINICAL TRIALS (Scott D. Putney& Dani
P. Bolognesi eds., 1990) (discussing the qualities of HIV relevant to discovering a
vaccine) [hereinafter AIDS VACCINE RESEARCH]; Wayne C. Koff and Daniel F. Hoth,
Development and Testing of AIDS Vaccines, 241 SCI. 426 (1988) (discussing the problems
inherent to discovering a vaccine for AIDS). There are two potential uses for an AIDS
vaccine, both under active research and clinical testing: therapeutic, or vaccine
administered to patients who are already sero-positive; and prophylactic, or vaccine
administered to preventFHIV infection. This paper will concentrate on prophylactic use.
4 See AIDS VACCINE RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 3-138.
51d. at 279-380. Koff & Hoth, supra note 3, at 429.
6Jon Cohen, Pediatric AIDS Vaccine Trials Set, 258 Sc. 1568 (1992); The Pink Sheet,
FOOD DRUG COSM. REP., Dec. 7, 1992, at TRADE & GOV'T MEM. 5-6. Phase II trials test
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increasing optimism that a successful vaccine may be developed by the end of
the decade.
Almost concurrent with the initiation of AIDS vaccine research, many
observers expressed concern about the potentially negative impact of the
liability of drug manufacturers on the development and distribution of an
AIDS vaccine.7 This apprehension is not unfounded, particularly in the vaccine
context. Beginning in the 1960's, manufacturers' liability costs and fears
contributed to decreasing participation by manufacturers in the vaccine
market.8 When the supply of one important childhood vaccine, DPT, became
threatened, 9 Congress responded by passing the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986.10 The Act extended liability protection to vaccine
manufacturers by creating the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program. This Program established a federal no-fault system of compensation
for victims of vaccine-related injury.1 By removing primary allocation of
responsibility for compensation from the tort system, manufacturers
presumably had more incentive to stay in the market as well as develop new
vaccines. In addition, victims would receive compensation more efficiently
under the Program than from litigation.12
The legal system directly shapes innovation through its civil liability laws. 13
From the manufacturer's point of view, the risk of liability is an important
primarily for safety and immune response, not efficacy. For technical information about
the vaccines, consult the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. As many
as eight AIDS vaccines are in clinical trials, if therapeutic use is included. Barre-Sinoussi
et al., supra note 2, at 868.
7 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, 12 (1988) [hereinafter IMPACT OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY]; Richard Cooper, The Makers ofAIDS Vaccines Will Need Protection from Product
Liability Suits, MANHATTAN LAWYER, June 14,1988 at 38; Koff and Hoth, supra note 2, at
431; Andrew Blum, AIDS Research Faces Hurdle: Who's Liable?, NAT'L L.J., July 29,1991,
at3.
8 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 46 (1985).
9 See SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99th CONG. 2D SESs., REPORT ON CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS
68-70 (Comm. Print 1986).
1042 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 -33 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
11See Wendy K. Mariner, Report for Recommendation 91-4: Innovation and Challenge:
The First Year of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, in ADMIN. CONF. U.S.
409,425-39 (1991).
12Id.
13 See generally IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7, Richard J. Mahoney &
Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246 Sct.
1395 (1989) (arguing that there has been a proliferation of products liability lawsuits,
which in turn has diminished the incentive to create new products and engage in
scientific research.). The legal system has traditionally provided incentives for
technological innovation through patent protection, which confers a 17 year monopoly
on the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). See generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES,
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aspect of the market that enters into decision-making.14 In its focus on
providing disincentives to manufacturers for making unsafe products, the
tort-based product liability system has created an additional, disturbing
disincentive. Companies are increasingly reluctant to develop and
manufacture products that, although saving many lives, may nonetheless
unavoidably injure a few consumers.1 5 Drug companies must confront the
potential for product liability as well. Perceived liability is thus intimately
related to incentives to develop and produce vaccines. The potential risk of
liability is especially acute when a company's exposure is uncertain, as with an
experimental vaccine for AIDS. The impact of potential liability may become
crucial in the AIDS context. In the AIDS vaccine market, a relatively small
biotechnology manufacturer may be n unable to obtain liability insurance even
though it has developed a new vaccine designed to prevent this widespread,
fatal disease.16
Many observers have proposed a federal, no-fault compensation scheme for
injuries caused by an AIDS vaccine as a partial or total replacement of the tort
system.17 The possibility that the perceived risk of liability is hampering AIDS
vaccine research has spurred proposals of AIDS-specific legislation. Two states,
California18 and Connecticut, 19 have recently enacted laws extending liability
protection to manufacturers of AIDS vaccines.20 Recently, federal legislation
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (1992) (a textbook on patent law). Such market protection is
especially important for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, where
development costs arehigh and there are manyproductfailures for every single product
success.
14Liability costs reduce the return on R & D investment, which in turn is the
determinative factor in embarking on an R & D project. Vaccine manufacturers may
become even more acutely sensitive to the impact of liability, as the current
administration's assault on excess profits and the threat of price controls renders the
investment return forecast even more uncertain. SeeJon Cohen, Childhood Vaccines: The
R & D Factor, 259 Sci. 1528 (1993).
15See generally IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7; Mahoney & Littlejohn,
supra note 13, at 1395.
16Dan L. Burk and Barbara A. Boczar, Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Strategic
Industry at Risk, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791, 829-30 (1994). See also Joseph Earley, Can
Biotechnology Immunize Vaccine Manufacturers from the Products Liability Crisis?, 30
JURIMETRICS J. 351, 351 n.5 (1990).
17See, e.g., KEYSTONE CENTER, KEYSTONE AIDS VACCINE LIABILITY PROJECT, FINAL
REPORT (1990) [hereinafter KEYSTONE); H. William Smith 111, Note, Vaccinating AIDS
Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207, 209 (1992).
18CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50 (West Supp. 1995).
19CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-591b (West Supp. 1994).
20The laws differ in their focus: California protects vaccine manufacturers of an
FDA-approved vaccine, while Connecticut protects the clinical testing phase. Helen
Holt Blake, Note, The AIDS Vaccine: Legislation to Limit Manufacturer Liability, 27 TULSA
L.J., 757, 766-67 (1992).
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was proposed that closely mirrors the existing National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act.21
In considering special AIDS legislation to alleviate the liability burden,
legislatures have focused almost exclusively on the research and development
(R & D) phase. Focusing on the R & D phase reflects a concern for maximizing
the research effort toward AIDS vaccine development 22 An even greater
concern is the impact of potential liability on manufacturers of a licensed AIDS
vaccine, which is ready for distribution throughout the country The AIDS
context represents an unprecedented convergence of elements: (1) a
widespread, deadly epidemic of huge economic impact; (2) a highly
politically-charged atmosphere; and (3) heavy participation by a strategically
important, young biotechnology industry. The inherent uncertainty and
complexity of AIDS precludes simplistic replication of pre-existing vaccine
legislation. To the extent that the AIDS context is unique and inherently
uncertain, an effective federal compensation scheme must respond to the
singular problems posed by the introduction of a licensed AIDS vaccine.
Although the licensing of an AIDS vaccine is still some years away, the
enormity of the public health problem created by AIDS compels a serious
examination of a federal compensation scheme as a possible solution to the
liability problem.
This paper will examine the creation of a federal AIDS compensation scheme
for victims of injuries caused by vaccines which are distributed as part of a
national immunization program. As a preliminary inquiry, I will examine the
impact of perceived liability on potential manufacturers to determine whether
the risk of liability for manufacturers decreases the possibility that a successful
AIDS vaccine will be introduced into the market. I will then discuss whether,
given the present laws and economic incentives surrounding the vaccine
industry, a federal compensation scheme for an AIDS vaccine is necessary. After
analyzing the unique problems of AIDS and its implications for the design of
a compensation scheme, I will present one model for a compensation scheme.
The model is premised upon the distinctive difficulties of the introduction of a
licensed AIDS vaccine in the mass immunization context. The need for
implementation of an active post-market surveillance system will be
addressed. Finally, I will discuss the possible costs of such a program,
emphasizing the impact of the chosen immunization strategy on the extent of
liability.
21138 CONG. REC. H8130-04 (daily ed. Aug. 12,1992). See also, Jon Cohen, Liability Bill
Introduced in Congress, 257 Sci. 1035 (1992) (providing a brief overview of the Bill's
limitations on punitive and compensatory damages).
22This is also because the mass immunization context is seen as inherently even more
unpredictable than the R & D phase. See, e.g., KEYSTONE, supra note 17, at 17.
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II. LIABILIY-THREAT OR EXCUSE?
A major premise underlying the implementation of a compensation scheme
for the AIDS vaccine is that the threat of manufacturer liability could hamper
the development of an AIDS vaccine. In addition, the threat of liability would
negatively affect market participation by potential vaccine manufacturers. 23 A
number of other considerations purportedly enter into the R & D decision. Yet
the risk of liability is the most important factor cited by manufacturers in
explaining their hesitancy or refusal to enter the AIDS vaccine research effort.
Since the threat of liability is so central an issue in implementing a federal
compensation scheme for the AIDS vaccine,24 it is appropriate to at least
reconsider this premise.
A. Basis and Evidence for the Negative Impact of Liability in the
AIDS Vaccine Context
The threat of liability in the vaccine industry has historical underpinnings.
Beginning in the late 1960's, a series of large damage awards for injuries caused
by childhood vaccines created an uncertain market environment for all vaccine
manufacturers. The manufacturers believed the cost of liability would drive
them out of the market.25 Between 1968 and 1977, more than half of the vaccine
manufacturers in the U.S. did indeed withdraw from production. 26 When the
supply of DPT, a major childhood vaccine, became threatened, 27 political
pressure mounted on Congress to mitigate this situation by alleviating some
of the liability burden. The response was the National Childhood Vaccine Act
of 1986.28
The federal government discovered the potentially staggering cost of
liability in administering a vaccine when it passed the Swine Flu Act of 1976.29
In anticipation of a swine flu epidemic, the federal government had undertaken
an ambitious vaccination strategy and assumed all liability for injury in order
23 See Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines? 256 Sci. 168 (1992). The severe
toll of liability costs on drugs, vaccines, and other lifesaving products is
well-documented and has elicited legislative proposals and other solutions
recommending tort reform. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 13, at 1397-98.
24 The other major rationale is providing fair compensation to victims who sustain
vaccine-related injuries.
25 H.R. REP. No. 99-908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., 6347-48.
26 INSTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 46. Some vaccines, such as measles, mumps,
and rubella, have only one manufacturer, raising fears that the sole supplier of a critical
vaccine may withdraw from that market altogether. Id. at 29.
2 7 See REPORT ON CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 9.
28 See supra note 10.
29 National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 247 b(j)-(l) (1976),
amended by Pub.L.No. 95-626, 92 Stat 3574 (1978).
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to guarantee vaccine supply from otherwise reluctant manufacturers. 30 The
result was an avalanche of litigation involving millions of dollars worth of
settlements--an ironic reward for attempting to prevent an epidemic that failed
to materialize. 31
Recent reports have cited the threat of liability as having already exerted an
impeding effect on the progress of AIDS vaccine research. 32 Large established
pharmaceutical companies, traditionally leaders in R & D, are noticeably
absent from the AIDS vaccine effort.3 3 The participation instead by
biotechnology companies raises the additional concern that these relatively
small firms would be even less able to withstand liability costs than the large
pharmaceutical companies.34 One large pharmaceutical concern recently
withdrew from a collaborative NIH trial, citing its potential liability as the main
reason for its refusal to participate.35 Another firm offered to "donate" its
vaccine to the federal government for testing in return for complete immunity
from liability.36 The message from the manufacturers is clear: liability concerns
are a crucial issue in the development and distribution of an AIDS vaccine. As
clinical trials progress and licensure becomes imminent, pressure will
undoubtedly mount on Congress to provide some kind of liability protection
in order for the AIDS vaccine to be sold.
B. Signs That Liability is a Factor of Lessening Concern
Just as there are indications that the fear of liability may be negatively
influencing R & D efforts towards finding an AIDS vaccine, there are also
indications that liability may be a factor of lessening, albeit lingering, concern.
One sign is the extent of R & D participation in the AIDS vaccine effort. In spite
of their vocal concern over the threat of liability, over ten U.S. companies are
actively engaged in AIDS vaccine development.37 It seems unlikely that so
3 0 RIcHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, M.D., THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR:
DECISION-MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE 57-62 (1978) [hereinafter SWINE FLU].
3 1Smith, supra note 17, at 222.
32 Cohen, supra note 21.
33 Laurie Garret, The Waiting Game in AIDS Research: Giant Drug Companies are
Watching the Little Guys in the Quest fora Vaccine, NEWSDAY, September 18, 1990, at 5.
34 Burk & Boczar, supra note 16, at 829-30.
35 Paul Cotton, Infants, Science May Lose as Liability is Blamed for Company Pullout from
HIV Prevention Trial, 268 JAMA 1987 (1992). Abbott Laboratories wanted complete
indemnification before it would participate in the trials. Id.
36 See The Pink Sheet: Bristol-Myers Squibb's HIVAC-le Vaccine, FOOD DRUG COSM. REP.,
Sept. 28, 1992 at 7.
3 7Some of the participants: Genentech; Biocene (a joint venture between Ciba-Geigy
and Chiron); Oncogen (a subsidiary of Bristol-Meyers); Immune Response; Viral
Technologies (a joint venture between Cel-Sci and Alpha Biomedicals); Progenics;
Viagene; MicroGeneSys. Ongoing, active research into development of other vaccines
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many companies would engage in such extensive research for a product that
may never reach or remain on the market due to liability concerns.
Moreover, the recent stance of courts toward vaccine manufacturers seems
to have changed in favor of manufacturers. Market protection for crucial,
life-saving products such as vaccines has evidently become increasingly
important to the judiciary.38 A recent Court of Appeals decision holding that a
vaccine manufacturer had discharged its duty to warn was viewed as "a
significant victory for vaccine manufacturers."39 Similarly, courts have refused
to impose strict liability on manufacturers of blood products for public policy
reasons.
4 0
Implicit in these decisions is an increasing awareness of the importance of
market-based protection for manufacturers of life-saving products, a factor
largely ignored in earlier cases. It is important to remember that the
seminal-and most devastating-court decision concerning vaccine liability
occurred nearly thirty years ago.41 Arguably, the judicial attitude toward
product liability for vaccines has changed since then.42 Furthermore, the
seemingly precarious circumstance of a sole manufacturer of a given vaccine
has not yet yielded to a complete withdrawal from the market by other
companies, as has been often feared. 43 Nor has the disastrous liability track
record of the DPT vaccine been repeated. It is quite possible that the concern
over AIDS will produce some concomitant degree of reasonable immunity
conferred by the judiciary based on public health policy.
In conclusion, in view of the extent of AIDS vaccine R & D and the evolving
judicial attitude toward product liability for vaccines, the risk of liability may
not be as ominous a factor as previously supposed. While an in-depth analysis
of the effect of perceived liability on the decision to market the AIDS vaccine
also attests that liability is a factor of lessening concern. See infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
38 See generally Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 13, at 1397-98 (noting trend toward
reform of granting extensive punitive damage awards).
39Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 964 F.2d 1348 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 463
(1992) (holding that a vaccine manufacturer fulfilled its duty to warn by contractually
obligating the Centers for Disease Control to warn vaccinees directly). See Appeals Court
Rules for Vaccine Maker in Suit over Warning, LIABILITY WEEK, June 1, 1992, Vol. 7, No. 21.
4 0 E.g., Rogers v. Miles Laboratories, 802 P.2d 1346, 1352 (Wash. 1991).
41 Davisv. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121,131 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding vaccine
manufacturer strictly liable for failure to provide adequate warning). See Smith, supra
note 17, at 214.
4 2Certainly, Congress' passage of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act reflects
an increasing awareness of the importance of liability protection for vaccine
manufacturers.
4 3See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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is beyond the scope of this paper,44 it may be observed that the extent to which
the threat of liability has stymied progress toward development of an AIDS
vaccine is far from clear.45
Clearly, other factors must have entered into the decision to pursue the
time-consuming, expensive, and risky prospect of developing a successful
AIDS vaccine. One obvious possible incentive is the potential size of the AIDS
vaccine market, which could be substantial. Another incentive is an
increasingly positive track record of biotechnologically engineered sub unit
vaccines, such as that for hepatitis b.46
It is also possible that the extent of R & D could alternatively reflect the
implicit belief that the urgency surrounding AIDS will compel an altered
liability structure. Ironically, the development of an AIDS vaccine could well
provide its own leverage to force Congress to grant specialized liability
protection. A successful vaccine, once licensed, may be placed on the shelf by
its makers until the federal government acts to confer immunity.47
Even if liability costs are having only an uncertain impact in the
development of an AIDS vaccine, the case for implementing a federal no-fault
compensation scheme is not necessarily defeated. AIDS is a costly, devastating
disease. The mere possibility of a disincentive to vaccine production created by
the existing liability structure is itself reason enough to at least examine
proposals to remove such an obstacle. Furthermore, participation by the
strategically important, but relatively immature, biotechnology industry may
provide independent grounds for liability protection. 48 Finally, a federal
vaccine liability law that compensates victims without faulting manufacturers
reinforces an emphasis on regulatory control as the primary deterrence against
unsafe vaccines. Regulatory control produces a move away from punishing
manufacturers for marketing a vaccine that the federal government has
licensed as safe.49
44Decision-making under uncertainty is particularly complex. See, e.g., Richard R.
Nelson, The Role of Knowledge in R & D Efficiency, 47 Q. _ EcoN. 453, 459 (1982). It is
precisely the uncertainty surrounding AIDS vaccine liability that compels examination
of an AIDSvaccine compensation scheme as a possible incentive for vaccine production.
45Many would argue that any delay, no matter how small, is unacceptable. While
not halting research, a worst case scenario, liability arguably may still pose an
unacceptable barrier to bringing a licensed vaccine to market.
46These vaccines, consisting of biotechnologically engineered components of the
disease-causing organism, appear to be a safer alternative than a vaccine composed of
disabled (attenuated) virus. Earley, supra note 16, at 363 n.79.
471t is not beyond speculation to suppose that manufacturers are indeed banking on
such a scenario.
48Burk & Boczar, supra note 16, at 829-30.
49A compensation scheme reflects the belief that those injuries deserving
compensation are broader than those for which the manufacturer should be held
responsible.
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III. IS A FEDERAL COMPENSATION SCHEME NECESSARY FOR THE AIDS VACCINE?
In considering the problem of the threat of potential liability on the
development of an AIDS vaccine, many observers have suggested that a federal
compensation scheme be modelled on the National Childhood Vaccine
Program. 50 Similar to the assumption about the negative impact of the threat
of liability on AIDS vaccine development, this recommendation should also be
examined to determine whether a federal AIDS vaccine compensation scheme
is indeed necessary in the AIDS context. Perhaps this proposal is a predictable,
but inappropriate, response. Since the National Childhood Vaccine Program is
the most oft-cited template for AIDS vaccine legislation, a brief background of
this scheme will preface the larger question of whether a federal compensation
scheme is appropriate in the AIDS vaccine context.
A. The National Childhood Vaccine Compensation Program
The National Childhood Vaccine Program is a narrowly-focused no-fault
scheme for vaccine-caused injury. Seven mandatory childhood vaccines are
covered by the scheme,51 which provides compensation for victims (usually
children) who have suffered injuries delineated in the Vaccine Injury Table.52
The Vaccine Injury Table is a device to streamline otherwise long and expensive
causation inquiries: the claimant must establish an injury listed in the table
which in turn creates a presumption of causation. 53
In order to receive compensation, a victim must initially file a claim in federal
claims court, where a special master examines the evidence and determines the
award. 54 The scheme pays for unreimbursed medical expenses, lost earnings,
and limits damages for pain and suffering to $250,000.s 5 For claims filed for
injuries sustained after October 1988, a claimant must first file a claim under
the Program;56 however, a claimant is entitled to reject the special master's
award and seek tort relief instead. Once resorting to the tort system, however,
the claimant foregoes the right to collect the original award determined by the
special master.57
50 See, e.g., KEYSTONE, supra note 17; 138 CONG. REC. H8130-04, supra note 21.
51The scheme covers vaccines for measles, mumps, rubella, polio, diphtheria,
pertussis (whooping cough), and tetanus. The Act does not necessarily cover children,
although children are virtually the only recipients. See Mariner, supra note 11, at 416.
5242 U.S.C. 300aa-14(a). See Mariner, supra note 11, at 430.
53 Mariner, supra note 11, at 439-42. If the injury is not listed on the table, the claimant
bears the burden of proving causation. Id. at 431.
54id. at 429-431.
551d. at 434. There is also a fixed death benefit of $250,000. Mariner, supra note 11, at
434.
561d. at 426-27.
571d. at 436.
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The purportedly efficient adjudication resulting from streamlined causation
determinations from the Injury Table, and use of a special master, was designed
to provide incentives for victims to use the Program rather than resort to costly
and prolonged tort litigation. The Program has met with some success, as
evidenced by fewer lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers,5 8 although there
are those who complain that the Injury Table is arbitrarily and unfairly narrow
in scope.59
B. The Current Vaccine Landscape: Does the AIDS
Vaccine Warrant Special Federal Treatment?
Commentators, who point to special vaccine liability protection provided by
the National Childhood Act as a basis for extending this protection to the AIDS
vaccine, often fail to consider the entire vaccine landscape in assessing whether
a federal scheme of liability protection is warranted for the AIDS vaccine in
particular. A salient observation, however, is that other adult vaccines are not
presently afforded special liability protection.60 Vaccines for hepatitis b,
Haemophilis influenzae type b, pneumococcal pneumonia, and influenza are
recommended and routinely given to adults,61 yet none of these vaccines
qualify for the special federal liability treatment.
Conversely, several vaccines recommended for children are not presently
covered by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Adverse reactions to
Haemophilis influenzae type b and hepatitis b are not reimbursed by any
federal plan, although these vaccines have been recommended for all children
by the Centers for Disease Control.62 Recommendations for these vaccines
58See Laura Mazzuca, Shot Through with Problems: A Partial Success, Vaccine Injury
Fund Faces Case Logjam, Funding Shortfalls, Bus. INs. (Aug. 24, 1992). Vaccine-related
lawsuits against Lederle Laboratories, a leading maker of the DPT vaccine, have fallen
from over 300 in 1988 to a total of only 20 since then. Id. at 1.
591d. A recommendation to further narrow the injury table has caused much
consternation by proponents of the compensation scheme who argue that this will
unfairly exclude many deserving recipients. See infra note 116.
60 Except when, in rare instances, an adult is injured from a childhood vaccine
covered by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.
61See generally American College of Physicians, GUIDE FOR ADULT IMMUNIZATION
(1990)[hereinafter ADULT IMMUNIZATION]. There are also other vaccines, such as those
for yellow fever or cholera, given to adults for special circumstances, such as
international travel or military service. Id. at 63, 118.
62 See Centers for Disease Control, Hepatitis B Virus: A Comprehensive Strategy for
Eliminating Transmission in the United States Through Universal Childhood Vaccination,
Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee, 40 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. RR-13 (1991); Centers for Disease Control, Haemophilus B
Conjugate Vaccines for Prevention of Haemophilus influenza Type b Disease Among Infants
and Children TwoMonths ofAge and Older, 40 MORBIDITYAND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. RR-1
(1991). Recently, the American College Health Association issued a report calling for
1994-95]
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occurred after passage of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act; yet they
were not added to the list of covered childhood vaccines.
There is presently no federal compensation for injuries caused by
non-mandatory vaccines.63 Indeed, the axis dividing federally compensated
versus non-compensated vaccine-caused injury may best be characterized as
whether or not the vaccine is mandatory. It may be difficult to justify awarding
federal compensation for injury in which the risk of vaccine-related injury is
voluntarily undertaken by consenting adults. Allowing compensation for
AIDS vaccine injury in this context may also invite calls for compensation for
injury due to involuntary exposure to other toxic substances. 64
As a final observation, the lack of a federal compensation scheme conferring
liability protection for vaccine manufacturers has not stopped introduction of
other, successful vaccines, 65 nor prevented current active research into
development of still others.66 The promise of biotechnology has increased the
perception that more safe vaccines will be introduced against other infectious
diseases.67 This "explosion of vaccine research," fueled in large part by
biotechnology could be taken as further evidence that the liability shield
provided by federal compensation for vaccine-caused injury is no longer
colleges and universities to recommend hepatitis b vaccination for all students. See
Collegians Urged to Get Hepatitis B Vaccinations, THEHONOLULU ADVERTISER, May31,1992
at A-2.
6 3See Mariner, supra note 11, at 416; Mark A. Hofman, No-Fault System to Compensate
Vaccine Injuries, Bus. INS., Feb. 1, 1988.
6 4 See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics
Administrative Compensation Scheme, MD. L. REV. 951 (1993).
6 5 An example is the recombinant hepatitis b vaccine. See E. M. Scolnick et al., Clinical
Evaluation in Healthy Adults of a Hepatitis B Vaccine Made by Recombinant DNA, 251 JAMA
2812 (1984). Recommended for children and health care workers, this vaccine generated
approximately $200 million in sales in 1992, with growth projections up to $2 billion.
An estimated 800,000 received the vaccine in 1992; as many as 30-35 million people per
year areprojected to be inoculated world-wide. See AAPAdvice Could Boost Hep-b Vaccine
Sales at Merck and Smith-Kline Beecham, 14 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 9 (1992).
6 6 Wyeth-Ayerherst plans to develop a live attenuated respiratory syncytial virus
vaccine. See FDC "Pink Sheet", 12/7/92. Smith-Kline Beecham will invest up to $12
million to develop a hepatitis e vaccine, and plans to market its hepatitis a vaccine in
the U.S. See FDC "Pink Sheet," 9/7/92. Merck is currently developing a vaccine for
chicken pox and hepatitis a. See FDC "Pink Sheet", 11/9/92.
6 7 See generally Maurice R. Hilleman, Newer Directions in Vaccine Development and
Utilization, 151 J. OF INFEcTIous DISEASES 407 (1985). Recently, direct injections of a gene
from influenza A virus were shown to immunize mice; this simple, inexpensive
approach may prove to be effective in comba tting other pathogens, such as HIV. See Jon
Cohen, Naked DNA Points Way to Vaccines, 259 ScI. 1691 (1993) It is perhaps ironic that
biotechnology, in producing potentially safer vaccines, may prove to be its own best
insurance policy against liability costs in the vaccine arena. But cf Earley, supra note 16
(arguing that potentially lower efficacy of recombinant subunit vaccines may pose a
different liability threat).
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needed or justified.68 Manufacturers are developing and bringing these
products to market without asking for immunity. Should the AIDS vaccine be
treated any differently?
The current vaccine landscape provides strong arguments against granting
special immunity to manufacturers of an AIDS vaccine. Yet it is the inherent
uncertainty of the AIDS context, coupled with the seriousness and spread of
the disease,69 that compels a serious in-depth look at the creation of a federal
AIDS vaccine compensation scheme. As already pointed out, a federal AIDS
vaccine compensation scheme may provide a crucial, equitable element of
market certainty as an incentive for bringing the vaccine to market. The AIDS
vaccine may prove to be very safe; however, given the etiology and genetic
variation of HIV,70 the risks associated with an AIDS vaccine could well be less
predictable and potentially more serious than risks associated with other
vaccines. Further, given the huge cost savings the federal government may
realize upon a successful vaccine immunization strategy,71 it seems reasonable
for the government to share some of the liability burden, particularly since
federal regulations will have licensed the vaccine as safe. A federal plan, with
unified standards and a centralized forum, is a far more preferable scheme than
the patchwork of the state laws that may erupt in response to a licensed AIDS
vaccine. Perhaps most importantly, a federal plan may give additional impetus
to a national AIDS vaccine strategy, the success of which is critical to disease
prevention and ultimate eradication. Clearly, such a scheme may well be
justified, in spite of credible arguments against it.
IV. THE AIDS CONTEXT: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPENSATION SCHEME DESIGN
The AIDS context represents a singular convergence of elements that
necessarily must influence the design of a federal compensation scheme. To the
extent that this context differs from that of the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act, strict replication of the Act will prove to be an inadequate approach
to the problem of AIDS vaccine liability. The following section will examine the
unique elements of the AIDS context and their impact on the design of a federal
compensation scheme.
6 8
"[T]here is a renaissance of vaccine research in smaller biotechnology
companies-which large pharmaceuticals often invest in or buy outright-for AIDS,
herpes, malaria, rheumatoid arthritis, cancer and lupus.... See Cohen, supra note 14.
69As well as AIDS' staggering economic costs. See infra note 182 and accompanying
text.
70See generally AIDS VACCINE REsEARCH, supra note 3.
71 See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
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A. The Political Climate Surrounding AIDS
The AIDS context has, from the beginning, been highly politically charged.72
Almost constant media attention reminds the public about the AIDS epidemic
and the need for prevention and cure.73 Political pressures have already
influenced the course of the development of therapies for AIDS: initiation of
the compassionate use exemption, a form of expedited testing, was largely the
result of intense political pressure.74 Political lobbying by MicroGeneSys, a
major player in the therapeutic vaccine arena, resulted in an unprecedented
twenty million dollar award for a clinical trial, at the exclusion of other
vaccines. 75 The same biotechnology company was also largely responsible for
the passage of the Connecticut AIDS law providing liability protection. 76
The highly charged political backdrop of the AIDS context implies that
political forces will probably loom large should Congress decide to craft a
compensation scheme for AIDS vaccine victims. This means pressure from
interest groups, notably the AIDS pro-patient lobby and the biopharmaceutical
industry. To the extent that these highly vocal groups perceive that a
compensation scheme will promote the promulgation of an AIDS vaccine, both
of these interests will probably press hard for a passage of a broad
compensation program. The most obvious implication of this kind of political
influence is its potential impact on the cost of the program: pressure for a broad
compensation program means higher potential aggregate liability, which in
turn increases the cost of the program.77
Political pressure may also translate into an altered standard for approval of
a vaccine. A changing-some would say lowering-threshold of product
approval, characterized by a loosening of stringent peer review and approval
of data through acceleration of the approval process, has a potentially crucial
72 See generally AIDS: Cases and Materials, 177-262 (M.L. Closen et al. eds., 1989).
73 The media will also undoubtedly play a larger role should an AIDS vaccine be
licensed, or if any serious side effects are discovered.
74 See The Social Impact of AIDS in the U.S. (National Research Council, 1993), 92. This
development has already raised concern that this marks the beginning of a troubling
erosion of review standards in the drug approval process. Id. at 93.
75 See Jon Cohen, Did Political Clout Win Vaccine Trial for MicroGeneSys?, 258 SCI. 211
(1992);MicroGeneSys Defends ItsAIDS Vaccine Trial, 12(12) GENETic TECH. NEWS 3 (1992).
Responding to the ensuing criticism that the government was favoring one
pharmaceutical company over others, the Defense Department and the Department of
Health and Human Services recently agreed to broaden the trial to include other
vaccines. See Gregory N. Racz, Federal Agencies Agree to Broaden AIDS Vaccine Test, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 16,1993, at B-2. This provides yet another example of how political forces are
shaping the progression of development of AIDS vaccines.
76 See Frank Spencer-Molloy & Lyn Bixby, A Clever Move Leads to the Conflict in the
Research World; One Company's Racefor an AIDS Vaccine, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Feb.
2, 1993, at Al.
77 See infra notes 159-75 and accompanying text.
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impact on the compensation program: the extent of injury, and thus liability,
turns on the underlying safety of the vaccine itself. A lowered threshold of
licensure resulting from intense political pressure could have devastating
effects on the liability cost question, particularly when the vaccine enters into
the mass immunization context. 78
The political climate of AIDS, therefore, sends a note of caution to Congress:
lawmakers must craft a program to carefully circumscribe potential liability,
guarding against an over-inclusive program hastily enacted in response to
what may be intense pressure. In considering liability, Congress and the FDA
must also be wary of the ramifications of altering previously successful product
approval protocols; not only must careful research and design of the vaccine
attest to its safety, so must the federal government, in adhering to prudent
licensing standards.
B. The Disease
AIDS, like hepatitis b, has been characterized as a "lifestyle" disease.79 The
high-risk groups are defined by behavior that many find distasteful.80 This
behavior is also voluntary; indeed, virtually all of the present prevention effort
is aimed at trying to make people aware of this high-risk behavior and change
it.81 Many may thus view victims of AIDS vaccine-related injury less
sympathetically, since vaccine administration will most likely be targeted to
these high-risk groups. The fact that the primary victims of AIDS are
responsible adults may erode overall popular support for an AIDS vaccine
compensation program, particularly in view of the fact that many other types
of injury arising from involuntary exposure to environmental or workplace
toxic substances are not currently compensated by a federal scheme. 82
The predominant age of AIDS victims 83 could have a substantial impact on
the aggregate liability of a compensation scheme. Because many injured adults
78 See infra notes 157-58 infra and accompanying text.
79This picture is changing as the incidence rate among homosexuals is recedingwhile
the incident rate amongheterosexuals is increasing. See Timothy A. Green et al., Changes
in AIDS Incidence Trends in the United States, 5 J. OF AIDS 547 (1992). However, in terms
of prevalence-that is, number of current cases-the majority of AIDS victims (74%) are
homosexuals and intravenous drug users. See Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS
Surveillance, Oct. 1992.
80Examples of high-risk categories are homosexual men and intravenous drug users.
See HIV/AIDS Surveillance, supra note 79.
81See, e.g., World Health Organization, Prevention of Sexual Transmission of Human
Immonodeficiency Virus, WHO AIDS Series 6 (1990); J.L. SORENSEN ET AL, PREVENTING
AIDS IN DRUG USERS AND THEIR SEXUAL PARTNERS (1991).
82 See Rabin, supra note 64.
83 Seventy-nine percent of all HIV/AIDS-related hospitalizations during 1983-1988
were for patients aged 25-44. See Lisa S. Rosenblum et al., Increasing Impact of HIV
Infection on Hospitalizations in the United States, 5 J. OF AIDS 497 (1992). Seventy to ninety
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will qualify for lost wages, the extent of benefits may be much larger than the
present liability under the Childhood Act, where virtually all the victims are
young children. 84
C. The Vaccine
The AIDS vaccine will most likely be recommended, not mandatory. There
are presently no required adult vaccines, whereas all fifty states have
immunization requirements for most children's vaccines.85 Involuntary
exposure to state-mandated vaccines provided one of the strongest arguments
for providing compensation to victims of vaccine-related injury.86 A child who
is injured as the result of involuntary exposure to a required vaccine is a much
more compelling recipient of benefits than an adult who takes the vaccine
voluntarily.87 The probable voluntary aspect of AIDS immunization may thus
greatly erode support for providing compensation to AIDS vaccine victims.
The AIDS vaccine will most likely be a genetically engineered product,
similar to the recombinant vaccine for hepatitis b.88 Such a vaccine is perceived
to be much safer than attenuated, whole virus vaccines, which pose the
frightening possibility of causing disease.89 But recent data has indicated that
the "old fashioned" attenuated whole virus vaccine may also hold promise.90
The type of AIDS vaccine used might have serious implications for a
compensation scheme. Depending on which vaccine is licensed, the extent of
liability could vary over a drastic range. If a sub unit vaccine is developed,
percent of all IV-related deaths are males aged 25-44. See James W. Beuhler et al., The
Completeness of AIDS Surveillance, 5 J. OF AIDS 257 (1992).
84 But note that, in the case of permanent disability, a child would be entitled to
receive lost wages (payable at age 18). In this case, the child's injury would be more
expensive than that of the adult, based on longer life expectancy. See Appendix B.
85See Mariner, supra note 11, at 416; Alan R. Hinman & William S. Jordan, Progress
Toward Achieving the 1990 Immunization Objectives, 98 PuB. HEALTH REP. 436,438 (1983).
86See, e.g., Barbara J. Connolly, The Necessary Complement to Mandatory Immunizations:
A National Vaccination Compensation Program, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 137 (1986).
87 Particularly when, as already pointed out, AIDS is a disease that can be largely
prevented by behavioral changes, whereas childhood diseases, such as mumps or
measles, are contracted by coughing and sneezing. Note, however, that adults will not
be the exclusive vaccinees; children and adolescents will also be vaccine recipients.
88Emphasis has been on development of a "clean" AIDS vaccine composed of viral
sub units. See Koff and Hoth, supra note 3, at 427-428; Earley, supra note 16 at 362-65.
89See AIDS VACCINE RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 3-4,169. In extremely rare instances,
the polio vaccine, comprised of attenuated virus, can cause vaccine-associated paralytic
disease. See Centers for Disease Control, Poliomyeltis Prevention, Recommendation of the
Immunization Practices Advisory Committee, 31 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
22, 301 (1982).
90See Jon Cohen, Aids Vaccines: Is Older Better? 258 SCI. 1880 (1992); Vaccine Protects
Monkeys Against AIDS-Like Disease, 13(1) GENETIc TECH. NEws 6 (1993).
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liability may be a much smaller concern. 91 If akin to the polio vaccine, however,
an attenuated whole virus AIDS vaccine could cause very rare but
vaccine-caused AIDS, or possibly other serious complications, such as cancer.92
Moreover, varying efficacy rates of different vaccines may necessitate the use
of a more dangerous (i.e., one that elicits a higher rate of serious adverse
reactions) vaccine for certain risk groups. For example, a sub unit vaccine may
provide sufficient protection to occupational-exposure groups, such as health
care workers; but an attenuated whole virus vaccine may be required for
"behavioral" high-risk groups, such as intravenous drug users. In response, an
AIDS vaccine compensation program may have to be bifurcated, with two
sub-classifications depending on what type of vaccine is used. Alternatively,
there may only be a need for a compensation scheme for the more risky vaccine.
When the AIDS vaccine goes into the mass immunization phase, potential
rare serious adverse effects will not be known.93 This necessarily creates an
extremely problematic delineation of compensable injuries. In contrast, when
the National Childhood Vaccine Act was passed in 1986, the childhood vaccines
had been in widespread use for some years, and serious side effects were
well-documented. 94 This allowed creation of an injury table at the outset of the
compensation scheme, a useful device for streamlining the causation
determination of a claim. 95 The inherently prospective nature of an AIDS
compensation scheme poses the greatest difficulty in its design. This problem
dictates that a compensation scheme implemented at the beginning of a mass
immunization phase must have in place a mechanism for determining a
compensable event. This will be considered in more detail below. 96
Unlike the climate surrounding passage of the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act,
where near-eradication of disease by the vaccines had shifted public focus to
the risk of serious adverse reactions caused by the vaccines, the risk of
contracting AIDS looms much larger in the public mind than fear of side effects
from a successful vaccine that prevents contracting the disease. The public will
therefore probably be very receptive to a licensed vaccine. 97 Whether this
9 1 Unless the sub unit vaccine has lower efficacy and liability coverage extends to
contracting AIDS. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. See also Earley, supra
note 16, at 365-67.
9 2 See Cohen, supra note 23.
9 3 Phase IT[ trials, involving at most in the few thousands, will be the only basis of
known adverse side effects at the time of licensure. Rarer side effects will not be
discovered until the vaccine is given to many thousands of recipients; that is, a mass
immunization context.
94Although causation has been, and still is, contested for some of these injuries. See
Mazzuca, supra note 58.
95See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
96See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
97The fear of AIDS may extend to its vaccine, however, especially if the vaccine were
composed of attenuated virus. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Further, a
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receptiveness will add pressure to enact an AIDS compensation scheme or
diminish it, as high-risk groups may eagerly accept the inherent risk of
vaccine-caused injury in return for the invaluable protection against the
disease, is not clear. At the very least, public acceptance of an AIDS vaccine will
help ensure participation in a post-market surveillance system that will be
crucial in obtaining valuable data on vaccine-caused injuries for a
compensation scheme.98
In sum, examination of the salient unique features of the AIDS context
divides them into several categories, each with a powerful impact on the
creation and implementation of an AIDS vaccine compensation plan. The first
is the political climate surrounding AIDS. Congress must guard against
distortions of entitlements enacted in response to what may be intense political
pressure. The second is the typical victim of an AIDS vaccine-related injury, a
young adult who voluntarily took the vaccine. Lastly, the unknown extent and
frequency of serious side effects poses difficult problems of delineating a
compensable event and determining causation.
The AIDS mass immunization context forms a complicated landscape of
strong competing forces that will preclude simple replication of existing
legislative templates. In the next section, I will present one possible model for
a federal AIDS vaccine compensation scheme.
V. A FEDERAL AIDS VACCINE COMPENSATION SCHEME
An AIDS vaccine compensation scheme must be designed in response to the
AIDS context; it must evolve with the emerging picture of vaccine-caused
injury; and it must carefully circumscribe liability. To be successful, an AIDS
vaccine compensation program must provide fair compensation to AIDS
vaccine victims efficiently and help ensure a reliable vaccine supply by
providing a significant level of liability protection to vaccine manufacturers.
To those ends, a hypothetical AIDS compensation scheme would incorporate
features discussed below.
A. Should the AIDS Vaccine Compensation Program
Be a Separate, Independent Compensation Scheme?
A preliminary consideration is whether the AIDS compensation scheme
should be separate, specialized legislation or an expansion of the existing
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Given the singular problems created
by the AIDS vaccine mass immunization context,99 and the wide age swath of
potential vaccine recipients, the AIDS compensation scheme lends itself to
being a separate plan.
perceived inherent lifestyle disclosure in taking an AIDS vaccine may impede public
acceptance. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
98 See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 72-98 and accompanying text.
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Since the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act covers vaccines given to
young children and the AIDS vaccine will be given primarily to adults, it seems
inappropriate to suddenly include among the list of vaccines for childhood
diseases a vaccine for AIDS. Incorporation of the AIDS vaccine into the existing
childhood program is possible, but only with major changes in the structure
and perceived intent of the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Unless entitlement
to compensation will be dictated by age, with young children the sole intended
recipients of benefits, compensation for AIDS vaccine-caused injuries is best an
independent compensation scheme, based solely on exposure to the AIDS
vaccine.
Secondly, since the creation of this compensation scheme would be in large
part experimental and prospective, a specially designed hybrid program
would be the more appropriate as a legislative experimental vehicle.
B. Eligibility Criteria
A critical feature of an AIDS vaccine compensation scheme is its eligibility
criteria. Eligibility determines who is entitled to receive benefits and thus
determines extent of coverage and potential liability exposure. Issues of
fairness arising from degree of inclusiveness are thus triggered by delineation
of eligibility.
1. Jurisdictional Eligibility
Jurisdictional eligibility delineates the population entitled to seek benefits.
For the AIDS compensation scheme, jurisdictional eligibility would be identical
to that of the Childhood Vaccine Injury Program: anyone receiving a vaccine 100
in the United States would be eligible for access to the program. Certain
limitations to this general requirement, such as limiting jurisdiction to only
high-risk recipients, would pose unacceptable fairness and potentially
sensitive privacy issues. 101
A possible jurisdictional limitation based on the recipient's age would serve
to limit eligibility to those who presumably had less choice in receiving the
vaccine. Moreover, a program accessible only to children under a certain age
may evoke less opposition than a program that offered wider coverage that
extended to consenting adults voluntarily receiving the vaccine. 102 However,
since AIDS is increasingly perceived as a problem that cuts across all age
groups, notably including adolescents, drawing a jurisdictional age line may
prove to be problematic and unacceptable.
Another jurisdictional requirement could turn on whether the AIDS vaccine
is mandatory for certain populations, such as infants born to sero-positive
1001y an authorized administrator.
101Consider, for example, whether a vaccine recipient who suffered injury would
want to declare that she was an intravenous drug user and a prostitute.
102See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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mothers.103 The creation of involuntary vaccine recipient groups may compel
a somewhat different jurisdictional axis that allows program access only for
mandatory vaccine recipients. Adoption of this delineation of qualifying
populations may be complicated by the inevitable piecemeal state adoption of
mandatory AIDS vaccination. 104
As for date of eligibility, an AIDS compensation scheme implemented
concurrently with the initiation of a mass immunization vaccine program
would logically have an effective date as of the date of passage. That is, a
recipient would be entitled to access to the program as of the vaccination date.
2. Entitlement Eligibility
Entitlement eligibility determines who out of the pre-selected jurisdictional
pool will actually receive compensation by defining the characteristics a
qualified recipient must have in order to receive compensation. Accordingly,
AIDS vaccine compensation scheme eligibility depends on defining the precise
nature of the injury that qualifies for compensation. This comprises the most
critical and problematic element of the program, both from the administrative
and liability perspective.
a. What kind of injury should be compensated?
The type of injury historically covered by vaccine compensation plans is a
serious, acute, systemic injury, such as anaphylactic shock or neurological
disorders.105 In the AIDS context, however, the question has arisen whether an
AIDS vaccine compensation scheme should cover onset of the disease itself due
to lack of protection by the vaccine.106 Such a question can be answered by
history and practicality. No existing vaccine is 100% effective at preventing
103Another possible jurisdictional restriction is limiting program access to those who
take the vaccine because of occupational exposure to the virus. Health care workers, for
example, arguably have less choice concerning their exposure to HIV than other risk
groups.
104Historically, rules regarding mandatory vaccination have been state laws. A recent
exception has been OSHA's mandated hepatitis b vaccine requirements. 54 Fed. Reg.
64004 (1991). OSHA's rule, however, does not make the vaccine itself mandatory; rather,
the employer must make the vaccine available to employees, and the choice of whether
ornot to take thevaccine is voluntary. Considering thepredominantly adult population
of AIDS victims, and the fact that contracting the disease is preventable by behavior
modification, it seems unlikely that the federal government would choose to make the
AIDS vaccine mandatory.
105 See Wendy K. Mariner, Compensation Programs for Vaccine-Related Injury Abroad: A
Comparative Analysis, 31 ST. Louis U. LJ. 599 (1987).
106Indeed, commentators have pointed to this very danger in citing reasons why
manufacturers may be unwilling to bring an AIDS vaccine to market. Such observations
reflect the assumption that development of AIDS in spite of vaccination is within the
purview of manufacturer liability. See, e.g., Helen H. Blake, The AIDS Vaccine: Legislation
to Limit Manufacturer Liability, 27 TuLSA L.J. 757, 771 (1992); Earley, supra note 16, at
363-65.
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disease; studies report 90-95% efficacy for the most protective vaccines, such
as measles and polio.107 For any population receiving the AIDS vaccine,
therefore, there will be a quantifiable (but very small) number of recipients who
may contract the disease.108 Presently, no compensation program in place in
any country offers protection for development of the disease the vaccine was
administered to prevent, unless that disease is shown to be caused by the
vaccine itself, as in polio.109 The purpose of a vaccine compensation scheme is
to reimburse victims who, in taking the risk of the vaccine, suffered from severe
unavoidable side effects. The risk of contracting the disease itself is drastically
reduced by receiving the vaccine in the first place. This presumably is the
reward for the vaccines, albeit not a guaranteed reward for every single
recipient.
There may nonetheless be pressure to extend compensation coverage to
development of AIDS after vaccination, as some may view such coverage as
an inducement to take the vaccine. Implementation of this potentially broad
coverage could drastically increase the cost of the program due to the extensive
and prolonged medical care required by AIDS. 110 Further, if vaccine efficacy
were eroded by recipients engaging in high-risk behavior, a problem would
arise as to whether efficacy voluntarily lowered would qualify the recipient for
compensation. Such a plan would also necessarily entail administrative
complications, such as requiring testing for sero-presence of HIV antibodies
before administering the vaccine. 111 Moreover, given the possibility of a
therapeutic benefit of an AIDS vaccine, this plan, by excluding vaccination of
sero-positive recipients, would ignore the potentially positive aspects of
inadvertently inoculating a sero-positive recipient. Besides possibly increasing
cost and entailing administrative complications, such a plan would change the
focus of the insurance scope of the compensation scheme.
Allowance for coverage of contracted disease in the AIDS context is arguably
an option, but one that is not supported by the precedent or purpose of other
vaccine compensation schemes.
107See Sharon Snider, Childhood Vaccines, 24 FDA CONSUMER 19 (September 1990).
108Until complete herd immunity is achieved. Herd immunity is defined as the
percentage of the population that needs to be immune to interrupt transmission. See
J.W.G. Smith, Proceedings of the International Conference of the Application of Vaccines
Against Viral, Rickettsial, and Bacterial Diseases of Man, Pan American Health Org. 316-18
(1971).
109 See generally Mariner, supra note 105; see also supra note 89.
1l 0See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
111This would also be complicated by the lag time between exposure to the virus and
appearance of the antibodies; thus, a vaccine recipient could have tested sero-negative
although he was exposed to the virus and received vaccine, and be eligible for coverage
at the onset of the disease.
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b. Defining a compensable injury: the "evolving" injury table
In addressing the problem of defining a compensable injury, the injury table
has proved to be a valuable means of streamlining the often arduous,
expensive, and disparate causation determinations that have plagued
jury-based litigation.112 Success of other no-fault compensation schemes for
vaccine and medically-based injury is largely determined by the injury tables,
which provide a presumption of causation and thus elimination of wasteful
duplicative causation determinations.113 Importantly for cost and funding
concerns, the specificity of the table also determines the extent of potential
liability exposure: if coverage is too broad due to allowance of attenuated
causation, liability exposure may be unnecessarily high; on the other hand, if
the table is too stringent, the program will unfairly exclude deserving recipients
from its coverage. The more specific an injury table, the more likely the success
of the program.114
Since the AIDS compensation scheme probably will be implemented at the
initiation of a mass immunization program, data concerning frequency of
serious adverse reactions would be little to non-existent.11 5 Therefore, an injury
table itemizing the precise injuries that qualify for compensation will be
tentative and open-ended. This is a serious drawback that has an important
cost ramification: an injury table based on scarce data runs a serious risk of
being overinclusive.11 6
In designing a solution to this problem, an efficient, reliable administrative
mechanism must be implemented to initiate and develop an "evolving injury
table." The nascent, or core, injury table at the onset of the program would
contain certain "generic" injuries that are known to occur with several other
vaccines: anaphylaxis, for example. 117 In addition, any significant adverse side
effects that appeared in the Phase III trials would likewise be included. A
continuous review and recommendation system, discussed below, will be
necessary to update and revise the table. This system of adding injuries to the
core table employs a scientific basis for defining vaccine-related injuries and
112 See Mariner, supra note 11, at 440.
113 See Laura Mazzuca, Vaccine Fund Could Be Expanded, Bus. INS. August 24,1992, at
21.
1141d.
1 15 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
1 16 See Mazzuca, supra note 113. There are presently recommendations by the
Department of Health and Human Services to delete certain injuries from the Vaccine
Injury Table. See 57 Fed. Reg. 36878 (1992). See also FDC '"ink Sheet" Aug. 31, 1992, at
7. The proposed narrowing encompasses injuries associated with DPT,
measles-mumps-rubella, and inactivated polio vaccine. Id. Those recommendations
have been challenged on the grounds that they stem from misinterpretation of study
results. Jan Erickson, Director, National Vaccine Information Center, personal
communication and unpublished comment.
117The potential exists for hypersensitive reaction to any vaccine component.
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offers the cost advantage of expanding liability only when such expansion is
supported by scientific evidence.118
Development of the table will be dictated by causation determinations made
by a scientific panel. Once the scientific panel makes a causation finding, it
would submit a recommendation of whether or not to incorporate an injury
into the existing injury table. During the initial mass immunization period,
when injuries are not yet established, panel determinations and
recommendations would be more frequent; as the injury table stabilized due
to conclusive causation determinations, the need for a scientific panel would
lessen and perhaps ultimately disappear.
Treatment of data concerning vaccine-caused injury would parallel that of
clinical studies. Likelihood of causation, based on existing knowledge, would
be reflected in tentative causation categories. 119 Temporal correlation would
obviously be the most compelling initial support for causation; however, since
there is a possibility that, in the AIDS context, other, more complicated,
longer-latency injuries may arise, temporal considerations must not be
dispositive. 120
There is currently much debate over whether a jury or an expert scientific
panel is the appropriate forum for deciding certain causation issues.121 In the
AIDS vaccine context, a scientific panel seems much more appropriate to
determine causation questions than lay juries selected over many state
jurisdictions. First, a scientific panel has the benefit of expertise in interpreting
often difficult data. Second, as a centralized repository of such data, such a
panel would lend consistency to decisionmaking. Third, employing a scientific
panel to determine causation is a logical extension of the federally regulated
approval system that already exists for vaccines. Most importantly, an
impartial scientific basis for causation is paramount in the AIDS vaccine
context, where reliability and certainty are presently scarce.
118The reverse process, as exemplified by the Childhood Injury Table, results in
overpayment of benefits. See Mariner, supra note 11, at 431, 439-42. See also The National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: A Program Review (Office of Inspector General,
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1992) [hereinafter Program Review] (finding that
the present vaccine injury table does not reflect the latest scientific evidence and
conforming the table to concur with scientific evidence would result in significantly
lower compensation rates).
119Causation categories: definite, probable, possible, none.
120However, as with other long-latency diseases, the causation determination
becomes extremely problematic, particularly if multiple causes contribute to the
resulting complication. Note that, if the injury is AIDS, caused by the use of an
attenuated whole virus vaccine, the latency period may be as long as ten years. See THE
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF AIDs: ExPREssION, OCCURRENCE, AND CONTROL OF HUMAN
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS TYPE I INFECTION (Richard A. Kaslow & Donald P. Francis,
eds., 1989).
121See generally, DanL. Burk, When Scientists Act Like Lawyers: TheProblem ofAdversary
Science, 33 JURRMETRicsJ. 363 (1993).
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Development of an evolving AIDS vaccine injury table depends on obtaining
reliable data concerning possible vaccine-caused injuries as well as expert
interpretation of that data to determine whether the injury was indeed caused
by the vaccine. This suggests the need for a uniform, coordinated data
gathering mechanism akin to an extended clinical study. To this end, a formal
post-marketing data surveillance program should be implemented concurrent
to an AIDS vaccine compensation program. 122
3. Benefits
The benefits covered by the AIDS vaccine compensation scheme would be
modeled after the National Childhood Vaccine Act, which provides for
unreimbursed medical expenses, lost wages, a death benefit, and a capped
non-economic award.123 A limit on the non-economic award is critical to
containing costs of the program.
Should the notion of comparative fault as reducing the amount of the award
be considered if certain injuries are correlated with certain behaviors or
population groups?124 Probably not. Besides the difficulty in getting claimants
to admit or divulge perhaps personal sensitive information, a perceived
impediment to receiving compensation on these grounds could have the
undesired effect of souring public acceptance of the vaccine, due to
stigmatizing effects.
4. Administrative Structure and Procedure
Procedure for claim submission and eligibility and award determination
would closely parallel the Childhood Vaccine Injury Program, 125 with a slight
procedural modification based on the evolving injury table concept. Claims
would be submitted initially to the United States Claims Court. For injuries that
are on the existing injury table, the claim would be submitted to a special master
for causation affirmation and award determination. If an injury is not on the
existing injury table, a finding of probable causation from the scientific panel
would be required before the claim would go to the special master for award
122 See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
123 See Mariner, supra note 11, at 434. The non-economic award is limited to $250,000;
the death benefit is $250,000.
12 4 This kind of injury would indicate multi-factorial causation; assignment of liability
would become even more problematic if one of the correlative variables was a voluntary
behavior, such as needle drug use.
125 See Mariner, supra note 11,429-31. See also Program Review, supra note 118, at 10-14
(finding processing of casesis efficient under present compensation program). The only
exception to that general opinion is the large influx of pre-1988 cases. Id. at 8-9 (finding
that the program was struggling with the unanticipated influx of retrospective cases,
where retrospective cases are for injuries sustained before the effective date of the Act).
This cumulative caseload would presumably not appear in the AIDS vaccine context,
however, since the compensation program would presumably be enacted almost
concurrently with the promulgation of the AIDS vaccine.
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determination. Injuries classified by the panel as definite or probable would
thus qualify for award determination. Injuries with null causation classification
would be denied award. Injuries classified as possible causation would have a
pending status; outcome of those cases would have to wait for additional data,
with a maximum period of a year for disqualification. If not disqualified, the
claimant would be awarded compensation.
The additional procedural layer of causation classification for injuries not
delineated on the injury table would create some delay for claimants, but
probably no more than traditional litigation. Moreover, for the sake of ultimate
accuracy, acquiring more information is the proper way to approach causation
determination, rather than forcing a jury to come to a decision at the arbitrary
point of an individual trial.
5. Funding Mechanism
Funding for an AIDS compensation scheme would be provided by a
combination of an excise tax on the vaccine and general appropriations, as in
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.126 Since the entire population will
benefit from preventing the disease through vaccination, funding from general
appropriations seems a fair way to spread the cost of the program. Further, the
federal government will realize substantial cost savings in prevented AIDS
cases;127 some of those cost savings could be earmarked for compensation to
those who participated in vaccination.
If the cost burden were placed solely on an excise tax, there is a danger that
the cost-which is invariably passed onto the consumer-would be
disproportionately high. The exact cost of an excise tax is uncertain;128 the
present excise tax cost for DPT, the most costly vaccine in terms of liability, is
$4.56 per dose.129 California has placed a limit of $10 per dose as a state-wide
excise tax for AIDS vaccines sold in California. 130 If recently licensed vaccines
12 6 An excise tax funds all post-1988 cases, however. As of August 1992, the tax was
generating an estimated $10 million per month. See Mazzuca, supra note 58.
127 See Jesse Green & Peter S. Arno, The Medicaidization of AIDS, Trends in the Financing
ofHIV-RelatedMedical Care, 264JAMA 1261 (1990). There has been a marked shift toward
public support of medical costs in treating AIDS.
128The amount of the excise tax depends primarily on two variables: the extent to
which the excise tax is the sole source of funding for compensation; and the overall cost
of the program, which in turn depends on the extent of liability exposure. See infra notes
156-75 and accompanying text.
129SeeFDC "Pink Sheet," 8/16/93. The vaccine is given in a fivedose series. See Centers
for Disease Control, Pertussis Vaccination: Acellular Pertussis Vaccine for the Fourth and
Fifth Doses of the DTP Series, 41 MORBIDITYAND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. RR-15 (1992).
130CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50 (Supp. 1995).
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are a reliable indication, the cost of the AIDS vaccine will probably be high.13 '
Adding an excise tax may make an expensive vaccine even more expensive.
Another problem with sole reliance on an excise tax is that the amount of
revenue generated could easily turn out to be deficient. The funding
requirements of an AIDS vaccine injury program depend in large part on the
extent of liability exposure. 132 The amount accrued by an excise tax on vaccines
is a function of the number of doses sold as well as the amount per dose;
therefore, the more targeted and narrow the vaccine strategy, the less revenue
generated by this funding mechanism. The parameters determining funding
liability will be considered in more detail below, when the cost of an AIDS
compensation scheme is assessed. 133
6. Exclusive or Alternative Protection?
Implementation of an AIDS vaccine compensation scheme rests on the
assumption that potential liability is a disincentive for vaccine manufacturers
to enter or stay in the market. Thus, a key to the success of an AIDS
compensation scheme is its ability to provide a quantum (i.e., significant)
degree of market predictability for manufacturers through reduced liability
exposure and therefore stability of the vaccine supply. The degree of residual
liability for manufacturers depends on the degree to which the compensation
scheme is an exclusive remedy; or, more precisely, the degree to which the
compensation program is de facto exclusive. De facto exclusiveness by an
alternative remedy is determined by its success in attracting claimants away
from the tort system. 134
A compensation scheme that is an exclusive remedy for the injured victim
would provide virtual immunity for AIDS vaccine manufacturers. The
difficulty with this program structure is not feasibility but rather perceived
unfairness. To deny a victim the option of pursuing a tort remedy appears
arbitrary and coercive. Further, many would argue that removal of the tort
system would also remove proper incentives for the manufacturer to adhere to
acceptable safety standards. 135 While an exclusive remedy would assuredly
131The wholesale price of a recently licensed vaccine for Japanese encephalitis is
$37.14. See FDC "Pink Sheet" 12/21/92.
132Which will in turn depend on the adopted vaccine strategy, as well as public
participation in the vaccine effort. See infra notes 154-185 and accompanying text.
133Id.
134This is important for manufacturers, for as the more successful the program is in
diverting claimants away from the tort system, the lower and more predictable is their
liability exposure.
135That the assurance of safety is necessitated by the tort system seems inappropriate
in the AIDS-indeed, any-vaccine context, where stringent federal licensing standards
dictate whether such a product ever comes to market.
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grant a greater degree of manufacturer immunity, a program offering
alternative compensation is preferable. 136
A simple alternative mechanism for compensation would have the
self-defeating attribute of leaving manufacturers open to an unknown degree
of liability Given the inherent uncertainty of the AIDS vaccine context,137
leaving residual liability as an open-ended question for manufacturers may
render the program a near-nullity in terms of its liability protection.
A hybrid solution that allows alternative compensation but incorporates
adequate disincentives for using the tort system provides a more desirable
liability framework in the AIDS context. The Childhood Vaccine Injury
Program serves as an excellent model.138 This system, with its aim for
providing a claimant with a faster, more efficient settlement, is designed to
build in rather equitable disincentives for victims who use the tort system. In
order to pursue a tort-based remedy, a claimant must first file under the
administrative system. If a claimant is dissatisfied with the award, she may
pursue a tort-based claim, but will be automatically barred from receiving the
administrative award.
In sum, an alternative liability system with built-in incentives for using the
federal mechanism of compensation provides the best equitable balance
between the manufacturers' liability uncertainty and the claimant's award.
7. Sharing Liability: Supported by Federal Approval?
For the same reasons the manufacturers want to avoid seemingly unfair
liability exposure, the federal government should be cautious about blindly
accepting all liability arising from the AIDS vaccine. 139 However, the federal
approval process for drugs and vaccines, with the resultant symbiotic
relationship between vaccine manufacturers and the federal government,
virtually dictates a more shared liability structure between the private and
public sector.
Given federal approval of an AIDS vaccine in terms of its safety through the
stringent testing process of expensive clinical trials, it may not be unreasonable
to suggest that the federal government shoulder at least some of the initial
liability burden for any unavoidable adverse side effects, even if hindsight
proves that a superior design of a vaccine would have been safer.140 From the
136There is another reason why a strictly exclusive program may be undesirable. If
this factor is considered while an AIDS vaccine compensation program is being drafted,
cost constraints may compel the program designers to considerably narrow the
eligibility requirements of an exclusive program.
137See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
140 Except when the manufacturer shows "unacceptable behavior" subject to tort
action. Unacceptable behavior has been defined as intentional violation of the law,
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manufacturer's point of view, such endorsement through liability protection
would reinforce the government approval process and strongly encourage the
risk-taking step of market participation.
Further, the AIDS epidemic, as pointed out, is extremely costly to the federal
government in terms of medical care expenditures. 41 When the AIDS vaccine
is first introduced to the general public, it is in the government's best interest
to do all it can to encourage the use of the vaccine by the voluntary recipients;
to the extent that the vaccine is accepted, the number of AIDS cases and the
concomitant costs will decline. Government sponsorship by assumption of
initial liability provides further endorsement of vaccine use by the general
population. Thus, providing at least a temporary window of immunity for
manufacturers may help accomplish several important goals of a proposed
successful vaccine program.1 42
V. AN AIDS VACCINE POST-MARKET SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
As discussed, development of an AIDS vaccine injury table, a critical
component of the compensation scheme, depends on availability of reliable
data as well as expert interpretation of that data. To the extent that an adverse
side-effect is rare, or causation is attenuated or probabilistic, large numbers of
vaccine recipients must be analyzed in order to adequately support causation.
The uncertainty of the AIDS vaccine context, combined with the urgent need
for a successful vaccine strategy, suggests the necessity of designing a program
that will serve as an important extension to the foundation laid by the clinical
trials. Therefore, an extensive, centralized post-licensing study should be
initiated at the time of the creation of the vaccine compensation scheme and
promulgation of the vaccine into the general marketplace.143 A carefully
conscious disregard for safety of others, or intentional conduct that was designed to
deceive or conceal. See KEYSTONE, supra note 17, at 11.
14 1 See infra note 181.
14 2 0ne possible solution to the allocation of liability is a "phased" liability model,
where a subdivision of liability occurs along a temporal axis. Just as testing the vaccine
occurs in stages, so could the liability assignment. During the first liability phase, when
the vaccine is at its most experimental posture for the general population, the federal
government could shoulder virtually all liability for vaccine-rela ted injury, except when
the manufacturer shows unacceptable behavior. See supra note 140. A possible
correlative posture would be to have the federal government assume liability for all
non-null causation classifications for the first three years of the post-marketing
surveillance study. See notes 143-53 infra and accompanying text.
143 There are presently several post-market surveillance systems for vaccines in the
United States, utilizing the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAER)
coordinated by the Centers for Disease Control. Most systems are entirely voluntary
and thus have limited reliability. Adverse reactions from childhood vaccines are
required to be reported; however, this data is likewise somewhat questionable because
of the unknown extent of participation. See generally Centers for Disease Control, 37
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 197 (1988). An AIDS vaccine post marketing
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coordinated surveillance system would serve two crucial purposes: first, it
would provide a centralized repository for important data about the vaccine,
its side effects, and efficacy; and second, it would form an integral part of the
overall vaccine strategy by calling attention to the vaccination effort through
its very involvement and follow-up on recipients of the vaccine.
A. Study Design
The population to be followed for purposes of the post-market surveillance
program would be recipients during the first three years of mass
immunization. 144 To be eligible for the study, participants would have to be
willing to cooperate with post-market surveillance for five years after receipt
of the vaccine.14 5 These voluntary recipients would be advised of the
possibility of attendant risk of the vaccine, and that, in return for receiving the
vaccine for free, must be willing to participate in the program for five years.
Participants will also be advised to avoid high-risk behavior, and any other
recommendations concerning avoiding the contraction of AIDS. Other general
safety protocols standard for clinical trials would be followed.
Upon receipt of the vaccine, the participant and administrator would be
responsible for recording any adverse events that occur. Reports of adverse
events would be turned into the appropriate state or local health agency, which
in turn would submit the data to the Centers for Disease Control (hereinafter
CDC). Reports of adverse events made to the manufacturer would also be
turned over to the CDC. The recipient would be closely monitored (i.e., once a
week) for the first month; monthly for the rest of the first year; then every six
months for the remainder of the study.
The data received at the federal vaccine study center would be classified and
analyzed. 146 Cases of similar presentation of side effects would be grouped and
the data further examined for causation determination by the scientific panel.
At the end of the study, a comprehensive picture would emerge about the safety
of the vaccine, made possible by the extensive centralized data pool.
What kind of data would be collected? Besides medical reports of injury,
ancillary data would help to elucidate other correlative variables. Such data
surveillance program would differ from those in place in its clinical-study like format,
with more detailed information and follow-up on participants.
144This would give a sufficiently large group for study. One would expect an initial
'bulge" of vaccine recipients when the AIDS vaccine is first available. Further,
information on adverse drug reactions during the life cycles of drugs indicates that the
"reporting rate during the second year is about five times greater than thatafter the fifth
year of marketing." Harold E. Paulus, FDA Arthritis Advisory Committee Meeting:
Post-marketing Surveillance of Nonsteroidal Anti Inflammatory Drugs, 28 ARTHRITIS AND
RHEUMATISM 1168-69 (1985).
14 5 Length of monitoring period would depend on the extent of the study, with the
idea that long-term effects may be important in the AIDS context.
146A comprehensive, computerized database would consolidate the information from
disparate sources.
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would include disclosure of lifestyle choices, sexual activity, and other
potentially sensitive information. Hence, the extent and quality of data beyond
the mere reporting of an adverse event will depend greatly upon the ability to
attract an adequate number of willing participants to the study.147 Receiving
the vaccine-even for free-and contributing to a body of knowledge that may
have no primary impact on the participant may not provide a sufficient
incentive for surveillance participation. Structuring a federal vaccine
compensation program to include coverage for AIDS contracted by
surveillance participants may be deemed necessary in order to attract fully
cooperative, reliable participants. 148
B. Advantages of the AIDS Post-Market Surveillance Program
The AIDS context provides a particularly compelling forum for embarking
on an ambitious coordinated post-market surveillance program. The
seriousness of the disease, the stubbornness of the epidemic, and the unusual
nature of the etiological agent, all argue for an extended quasi-clinical studies
forum for detecting and gathering data when the vaccine enters the mass
immunization context. Because the basic structure for a reporting system now
exists through the CDC HV/AIDS surveillance system,149 the incremental cost
of putting the AIDS post-market monitoring system in place may not be
prohibitive. 150
An objection to this post-market surveillance program is that the data
obtained will not be controlled; that is, there will not be a corresponding
number of study participants who do not take the vaccine. Ethical
considerations, as well as the scale of this surveillance program, preclude such
a study design. Public health interests dictate that all willing recipients must
be able to obtain a licensed vaccine. The value of information gleaned from a
control population is miniscule in comparison to the benefit of prevented cases
of AIDS. Further, the value of the study itself, as designed, must be weighed
against the alternative: a completely voluntary reporting system confined to
adverse events. The coordinated, centralized data collection and processing of
1471n any study, the more complete the data, the more reliable. Completeness is a
function of quality (i.e., the type of information obtained) as well as quantity (i.e., the
amount of information obtained).
14 8 Another strategy is to target the post-market surveillance program to states with
a history of cooperative populations for clinical studies.
149 See generally HIV/AIDS Surveillance, supra note 79 at 17.
150 0ne possible cost saving device would be to mimic the test centers' approach of
regular clinical studies. Vaccination for the post-market surveillance program could be
conducted at several immunization centers located in large urban areas where the
prevalence of AIDS is high (such as New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco). Since
the data generated by such a study would benefit vaccine manufacturers, they too could
shoulder some of the cost burden.
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vaccine-related information is also consonant with the overall trend toward
centralization of the national AIDS research and prevention effort.151
An AIDS post-market surveillance program would accomplish several
objectives outside the immediate scope of establishing AIDS vaccine-related
injury. A large problem in adult vaccination programs is their lack of
participation. 152 An AIDS post-market surveillance program would
undoubtedly raise public awareness of the AIDS vaccination effort, and hence
encourage participation. By closely monitoring and expanding the realm of
data collection, important information concerning the AIDS vaccine and AIDS
would also be gathered. A systematic surveillance for adverse reactions will
also help call attention to evolving issues in the immunization program, which
will most likely have generic value for other immunization programs. Finally,
a formal post-market surveillance program would re-emphasize the
semi-contractual nature of the immunization process by extension of the
concept of informed consent.153
VI. COST OF AN AIDS VACCINE COMPENSATION SCHEME
In assessing whether to create a new administrative compensation scheme
for the AIDS vaccine, cost of the program is an obvious pertinent consideration.
An estimate of program cost determines the funding obligation. Given the
present emphasis on deficit reduction, Congress may be especially sensitive
about the extent of cost exposure of such a program,lm in spite of political
pressure to fund it.155 While a detailed, accurate cost-benefit analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper, I will address some general points.
A. Aggregate Liability Costs
The approximate cost of an AIDS compensation scheme is the sum of the
cost of aggregate liability (arising from the claims) and administrative costs.
Administrative costs, while not inconsequential, will probably not be the
15 1See HIV/AIDS Surveillance, supra note 79.
152 See generally National Coalition for Adult Immunization: Activities to Increase Influenza
Vaccination Levels, 1989-1991, Centers for DiseaseControl, 41 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 772, 774 (1992).
153Re-emphasis on individual responsibility and choice, based on contract principles,
is an alternative means of tort reform. See generally THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber, Robert E. Litan eds. 1991).
154particularly in view of the funding problems currently plaguing the existing
childhood vaccine injury compensation program. See Mazzuca, supra note 58. As of
11/30/92, the program had made 600 awards totalling over $263 million. Expected
caseload is 180-200 claims per year. See Dept. Health and Human Services, Weekly Status
Report, 8/31/92. The major funding problem is due to the large number of so-called
retrospective cases, or claims arising from injuries sustained prior to 1988. See supra note
125.
155See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text..
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primary cost concern, even if a post-market surveillance system is taken into
account. As discussed above, the mechanism for implementing a
post-marketing surveillance program is already in place.1 56 Further, it is
difficult to imagine that, compared to administrative costs of litigation, the
administrative costs of the AIDS vaccine compensation scheme would be any
greater, particularly given the costly causation determinations.
The amount of aggregate liability arising from the claims depends on two
variables: the number of awarded claims and the extent of the award per claim.
The number of claims in turn depends upon the number of people receiving
the vaccine as well as the frequency of injury occurrence.157 The frequency of
injury occurrence depends on the safety of the vaccine itself, which is
determined in large part by licensing standards enforced by the FDA. 158
1. Aggregate Liability and Vaccine Strategy
Since the number of claims submitted is determined in part by the total
number of vaccine recipients, vaccine strategy has a potentially crucial impact
on liability exposure. 159 Vaccine strategy, a plan which delineates the targeted
recipients for immunization, is determined by a host of interrelated factors. 160
In the AIDS context, vaccine strategy will probably focus on epidemiological
and immunological factors, such as high-risk groups and duration of
immunity. Vaccination strategies can range from the very broad to the very
narrow. For example, an extremely narrow AIDS vaccine strategy would be to
vaccinate only partners of sero-positive patients. 161 A broad vaccination
strategy would be vaccination of the entire population.162
A comparison of the number of potential claims made under each type of
strategy illustrates the potential wide range of liability exposure of an AIDS
15 6See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
15 7The number of claims submitted is also a function of both public awareness and
use of the compensation scheme itself. See infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
158Viewed in this light, bowing to political pressure to expedite approval of an AIDS
vaccine could have serious cost repercussions. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
15 9Unless the vaccine turns out to beperfectly safe; that is, no serious side effects. This
is not an impossible scenario. Several existing vaccines have no serious side effects
reported. See ADULT IMMUNIZATION, supra note 61, at 7.
160 See generally Influenza: Virus, Vaccines, and Strategy (Philip Selby ed., 1976), 271-94.
16 1Such a strategy is probably administratively unworkable, however. First, the
strategy could only be used on partners of identified sero-positive people; since AIDS
testing is still voluntary, only a fraction of all potential targets would be known. Also,
immunization of partners necessarily involves disclosing the danger of HIV infection
to thatpartner(s). This entails anobviously sensitive disclosure thatmanypeople would
rather not make.
162 This was the strategy taken with the swine flu vaccine, with disastrous results, in
terms of liability. The immunization program was halted after over 40 million people
were vaccinated. See SWINE FLU, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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vaccine compensation scheme.163 A strategy aimed at immunizing high-risk
groups could indicate as many as 9 million initial vaccine recipients.164 A
strategy that included vaccination of all children would add at least 4 million
to that figure.165 A broad vaccination strategy akin to that adopted by swine
flu could translate into over 150 million recipients. 166 Thus, for a given
frequency of side effects, the incidence of vaccine-related injury would
concomitantly vary over a wide range. For an injury that occurred once in every
200,000 recipients, 167 the maximum number of claims for this particular injury
could range from less than 50 to over 700, or over a ten-fold range, depending
on the adopted strategy.168
The size of the award for each claim depends primarily on two variables:
the extent of the injury and the age of the victim. The extent of the injury
determines the amount of reimbursable medical costs; the age of the victim, in
conjunction with the extent of the injury, will dictate the amount of lost wages.
As a possible scenario, consider the occurrence of a hypothetical injury that
163These figures are necessarily speculative; their primary purpose is to provide a
preliminary comparison of possible scenarios.
164This general figure was deduced by summing average estimates of each of the
high-risk populations. See Appendix A. Population estimates were obtained from
various sources. High-risk groups for this analysis were: homosexual males,
intravenous drug users, children of HIV-infected mothers, and occupational exposure
employees. To simplify the model, all population groups were assumed to have a 100%
immunization rate, which is abnormally high. Although AIDS has a low transmission
rate, as much as the entire susceptible population may be targeted for immunization.
The long latency of AIDS, coupled with the approximation of an asymptomatic carrier
state of people who are unaware that they are sero-positive, is further argument for
immunizing the maximum number within each high-risk group. For more precise
estimates, each component of the high-risk population would be in turn reduced by a
fractional multiplier designed to incorporate HIV sero-prevalence (since presumably
these people would not seek vaccination).
165 See Appendix A.
166 Based on 150 million total population. See Appendix A. This large number was
reduced by a factor designed to reflect less than full participation. Such a plan has many
inherent difficulties, such as assuring adequate vaccine supply for such a vast
undertaking. See SWINE FLU, supra note 30.
167This is the recorded occurrence for Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS), an acute
neuritis, for the swine flu vaccine and serum-derived hepatitis b vaccine. See also Centers
for Disease Control, Hepatitis B Virus: A Comprehensive Strategy for Eliminating
Transmission in the United States Through Universal Childhood Vaccination, 40 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. RR-13, at 10-11 (Nov. 21, 1991). See also Alexander D.
Langmuir et al., An Epidemiological and Clinical Evaluation of Guillain-Barre Syndrome
Reported in Association with the Administration of Swine Influenza Vaccines, 119 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 841 (1984). The causative association between these vaccines and GBS
has come into question; this injury was selected for purposes of this analysis because of
its seriousness and relatively high frequency. See Appendix B.
168The maximum number of claims assumes full public participation in the
compensation program.
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causes 30 days of disability. Cost per case, subdivided by productive age, could
be $22,000 for victims under the age of twenty-five, and $25,000 for victims over
the age of twenty-five. 169 If the injury occurs at the frequency quoted above, a
strategy that targeted high-risk groups could generate aggregate liability of
$1.15 million.170 Compare that figure with $18.7 million, the estimated
aggregate liability of a broad immunization strategy.171 Given the broad range
of potential liability for one hypothetical injury,172 it is clear that the adopted
vaccination strategy has serious liability implications for a federal AIDS
vaccine compensation scheme.
The above example is merely a speculative foundation of cost estimates;
depending on the extent of injury, claim cost could rise dramatically. Injuries
causing permanent disability would be the most costly.173 For example, if 25%
of victims of the above injury were permanently disabled, a narrower strategy,
based on exposure risk, could cost $12 million, while the broad-based strategy
cost could approach $200 million.174 A program that covered the contracting
of AIDS itself would have a per-claim cost approaching $1 million. 175
1 6 9 This is a somewhat arbitrary axis; the underlying assumption is that, for injuries
sustained over the age of 25, lost wages must be included. Cost was calculated to be
based on ten days of hospital care at $2000 per day. See Appendix B. Lost wages were
estimated to be the average between $20,000 and $50,000 per year. Id. Note that lost
wages vary greatly depending upon the occupation of the claimant.
1 7 0SeeAppendix B. Figure is based on the incidence of 46 total cases at a cost of $25,000
per case.
1 7 1 See Appendix B. Figure is based on the incidence of 750 total cases at a cost of
$25,000 per case. These calculations do not include an award for non-economic injuries.
Note also that these figures are not annualized; that is, I have worked with totals without
estimating what percentage of these totals per year may be immunized.
172Note that the calculation was further simplified by considering only one injury.
The liability picture could be further complicated, and made more expensive, by
manifestations of more than one serious side effect.
17 3 See Appendix B. In the Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, awards
for permanent (neurologic) disability are typically over $1 million. See Mazzuca, supra
note 58, at 21. The ironic result is that, given the present cost figures, it would be more
expensive to care for a person permanently disabled by a vaccine-related injury than
had that person contracted AIDS.
1 7 4 See Appendix B. Injury cost is based on a 35 year old male, with life expectancy of
35 years. The cost of each strategy would dramatically increase if the victims were
primarily young children, due to the much longer life expectancy. Id.
175This figure is based on lifetime medical care cost of $100,000. Added to this base
figure is the maximum pain and suffering benefit (here, $250,000); lost wages ($150,000);
and a death benefit ($250,000). For cost estimates on AIDS medical care, see Fred J.
Hellinger, Updated Forecasts of the Costs of Medical Care for Persons with AIDS, 1989-93,
105 PUBLICHEALTH REPORT 1 (1990). The projected costof AIDS care is speculative, since
the treatment type and cost for illness can change as new drugs are developed.
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2. Other Determinants of Extent of Immunization
Vaccine strategy is only the initial variable that determines the extent of
immunization. If the AIDS vaccine is recommended rather than mandatory,
then the degree of public acceptance of the vaccine and participation in the
immunization effort play an equally important role in the extent of
immunization. These variables are even more difficult to quantify or estimate
than those above; yet they will be crucial determinants of liability exposure.176
Public participation in the immunization strategy will depend on
availability and cost of the vaccine, as well as perceived benefits and risks of
the vaccine versus risks of the disease. The established high-profile AIDS
constituency and the prevailing emphasis on prevention support the idea that
public receptiveness of the AIDS vaccine will be high. However, issues such as
sero-conversion must also be addressed in order to maximize participation by
an otherwise willing public.177 The problem of historically low levels of
participation in voluntary immunization efforts may also pose a problem in
the AIDS context, in spite of ostensible public support.178
3. Cost-Mitigating Factors
An AIDS vaccine compensation scheme would pay for unreimbursed
medical expenses; that is, expenses not already paid for by a third party
insurer.179 Many victims of vaccine-related injuries may be insured; to the
extent that their policies cover this kind of injury, the cost of the federal program
will drop accordingly.180 However, given the high percentage of AIDS medical
costs that is paid for by Medicaid, 181 insurance reimbursement may be a
relatively inconsequential cost-mitigating factor.
An obvious cost-mitigating factor for an AIDS vaccine compensation
program are the substantial cost savings of prevented disease. By present
176 As well as the possible success in eventually eradicating the disease.
1 77 A vaccine recipient, in generating antibodies, will test positive for IFV, based on
current diagnostic methods. Even if vaccination is an available explanation for
sero-positivity, admitting to taking the vaccine may, for many people, be an unwanted
lifestyle proclamation.
178 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
179For post-1988 injuries, the Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
provides coverage for actual past and estimated future medical expenses that are not
reimbursable by private insurance. See Mariner, supra note 11, at 434.
180 1n 1989, 38.9% of all hospital discharges were paid for by private insurance. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES at 118 (1992) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS].
181In 1988, 29% of HIV hospitalizations were covered by Medicaid. Observers agree
that the burden of AIDS health care is increasingly bome by the federal government.
See Lisa S. Rosenblaum et al., Increasing Impact of HIV Infection on Hospitalizations in the
United States, 1983-1988, 5 J. OF ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 497; see also
Green & Arno, supra note 127.
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estimates, each AIDS case has a projected cost of over $100,000.182 Currently,
approximately 50,000 new cases of AIDS are reported in the United States every
year.183 If just half of those cases were currently prevented, a minimum direct
cost saving of $2.5 billion of direct medical costs would be saved.184 A
significant portion of these medical costs are borne by the federal
government. 185 For an AIDS vaccine compensation program to fail to be
cost-effective, one could argue that the aggregate liability must at least exceed
the aggregate costs saved by preventing the disease.
B. How Can Liability Be Equitably Circumscribed?
The potentially wide range of several variables that would determine
aggregate liability in the AIDS vaccine context emphasizes the need for careful
program design in circumscribing liability scope. At the same time, care must
be given not to allow the emphasis on circumscribing liability to overshadow
fair compensation of the victims.
Avaccine strategy determined by public health officials and epidemiologists
poses the risk of conflicting with the cost containment perspective of a federal
AIDS vaccine liability scheme, where the focus may be on vaccinating the
fewest number of recipients. The broader the vaccine strategy, the higher the
potential cost; conversely, the narrower the vaccine strategy, the lower the
potential cost.
The present dearth of information concerning injury variables in the AIDS
mass immunization context virtually precludes a reliable cost calculation.
However, the exercise illustrates a crucial point: if an AIDS vaccine
compensation plan is implemented, the degree of liability exposure will be
greatly influenced by the particular vaccine strategy adopted. Careful
delineation of liability is of course warranted, especially in the AIDS context.
But should the concern for liability exposure extend its influence to
182 See Hellinger, supra note 175. This figure may rise substantially as new, expensive
treatments prolong the survival of patients with the disease. Moreover, this figure does
not accurately reflect cost of vaccine-prevented AIDS cases, which would not arise for
up to ten years after initiation of the vaccine program.
183projections range from 47,000-77,000 newly reported cases in 1992; 47,000-85,000
in 1993. Based on the newly expanded case definition of HIV infection, the number of
reported cases could rise by as much as 75% in 1993. See Centers for Disease Control,
Projections of the Number of Persons Diagnosed with AIDS and the Number of
Immunosuppressed HIV-Infected Persons-United States, 1992-1994, 41 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., RR-18, at 8 (Dec. 25, 1992); Centers for Disease Control, 1993
Revised Classifications System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition
forAIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 MORBIDITYAND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. RR-17,
at 6 (Dec. 18, 1992).
184Based on $100,000 lifetime medical care costs. See Hellinger, supra note 175. The
cost of treating all patients diagnosed with AIDS has been projected to be $7.8 billion in
1993. Id. The figure in the text does not include other cost savings, such as productivity
gains from prevented disease.
185See supra note 181.
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determination of the immunization strategy itself? If both plans are crafted
simultaneously-a distinct possibility in the AIDS context-there exists the
potential for one program to influence the design of the other, a potential for
what may be viewed as inappropriate compromise. No doubt these programs
must somehow work together; but the extent and cost of compromise must be
carefully contemplated. 186
VII. PROMULGATION OF A SUCCESSFUL AIDS VACCINE: TOWARD A
COMPREHENSIVE IMMUNIZATION POLICY
As repeatedly noted, the AIDS context is inherently uncertain. Whether a
safe, effective vaccine will ever be developed is unknown. If such a vaccine
were developed, its unavoidable side effects as well as its ability to eradicate
the disease are also unknown. Whether manufacturers would truly refuse to
market a federally approved AIDS vaccine without the liability protection
provided by an effective federal vaccine compensation scheme is uncertain.
Moreover, were such a federal compensation program implemented, its proper
design and probable extent of effectiveness are necessarily unclear.
Because a well-designed AIDS vaccine compensation scheme would remove
some of this uncertainty various proposals for such a scheme designed to meet
the mass immunization context should be carefully considered. As one
possibility, I have advanced a hybrid compensation model which incorporates
features of the existing Childhood Vaccine Injury Program along with a
post-market surveillance scheme that would serve as an extension of the
clinical study milieu that characterizes pre-licensure activities. The information
generated by such a model, coupled with the concerted national effort at data
collection, promises to yield far more than simply what adverse effects the
vaccine causes.
The proposal presented here is a preliminary model, admittedly tentative by
virtue of its prematurity. Whether or not this model is the best solution, or what
its impact would be on the AIDS vaccine market, is even more speculative. It
is presented not only for its own sake, but to spur a more probing
multi-disciplinary dialog among the wide-ranging participants of an AIDS
mass immunization program with the goal of developing innovative solutions
for the impending compensation and liability problem posed by the eventual
FDA approval of the AIDS vaccine. The tentative and speculative aspects of the
model will perhaps deepen the endeavor to craft a viable, progressive,
responsive solution to promote the success of an AIDS immunization program.
186Since the potential serious adverse side effects will not be known, pressure will
bear on the only other controlling variable: the number of vaccine recipients. For
example, a strategy dictated by liability concerns of a compensation scheme may target
an extremely narrow group of recipients, such as children of sero-positive mothers. See
Appendix A. This strategy is clearly not in the public health interest. The alternative is
to encourage vaccination for the entire epidemiologically-derived population but offer
compensation only to certain members of that group, an approach that is certain to raise
serious equity and administrative concerns.
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The AIDS vaccine endeavor has one primary goal: to eradicate AIDS
through an effective immunization program. A successful AIDS vaccine
campaign requires more than an adequate supply of a reasonably safe and
effective AIDS vaccine. Widespread acceptance and use by target groups is an
equally critical requirement. An AIDS vaccine compensation scheme is but one
part of the entire mechanism that must work in order for an AIDS vaccine
immunization program to be successful. But to the extent that such a
compensation scheme may further the overriding goal of eradication of this
deadly disease, it deserves increasing and detailed attention.
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APPENDIX.A
AGGREGATE LIABILITY AND VACCINE STRATEGY:
POPULATION ESTIMATES
I. At risk population estimates
A. Homosexual males
187
B. Intravenous drug users
188
C. Occupational exposure
189
D. Children born to sero-positive
mothers
190
II. General population estimates
A. Total population
191
B. Children
Under 1 year
192
Under 5 years
193
2.6 million
1.0 million
5.6 million
6,000
253 million
4 million
19 million
1 8 7Three percent of males from age 20. Recent data indicates a much lower number
of homosexuals than the Kinsey-based figure of 10%. See J. Gordon Muir, Homosexuals
and the 10% Fallacy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,1993 atA14. Source of general population data:
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 180.
188 Estimates of this population range from 750,000 to 1.2 million.
1 89 Source: Assistant Labor Secretary Gerard F. Scannell, News Conference on AIDS
in the Workplace (Dec. 2,1991). (transcript available on LEXIS). This category includes
those workers who are exposed to HIV while performing job duties (such as health care
workers, security guards, police, etc.).
190Born annually. Cumulative population not calculated due to statistical
insignificance of this category. See Jon Cohen, Pediatric AIDS Vaccine Trials Set, 258 SC.
1568 (Dec. 4, 1992).
1 91ource: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 180.
1 9 2 1d. There were 4.1 million births in 1990. Id.
1931d.
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APPENDIX B
AGGREGATE LIABILITY: HYPOTHETICAL INJURY
COST ESTIMATES
I. Type of case (overall frequency 1/200,000)
A. 25% mild: 14 days disability; no hospitalization;
no sequelae.
B. 50% moderate: 30 days disability; 10 days
hospitalization; no sequelae.
C. 25% severe: permanent disability; no deaths
II. Health care costs
A. Hospitalization, per day 194  $2,000
B. Non-skilled nursing care, per year195  $30,000
Ill. Cost of injury (for male victim, age 35, salary
$35,000/yr, life expectancy 35 years)
A. Mild
1. Medical costs $250
2. Lost wages $1,500
B. Moderate
1. Medical costs 196  $22,000
2. Lost wages197  $2,900
C. Severe
1. Medical costs 198  $480,000
2. Lost wages 199  $538,000
194 Director of Immunization Program, San Mateo County General Hospital. Also
based on average cost to community hospitals. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 180.
195 For severe cases.
196 Sum of $20,000 hospitalization cost and $2,000 general medical costs.
19 7This figure is notapplicable to children. Note, however, that lost wages are a small
percentage of total cost of this injury category; therefore, cost estimates for this injury
are relatively independent of age of victim.
198 Based on present value of annuity, term length 35 years, discount rate 5%. Not
corrected for inflation. This figure would increase drastically if victim were a child due
to additional years of required medical care. Therefore, cost estimates would be
dependent on assumptions about average age of victim for this injury category.
199 Based on present value of annuity, term length 30 years, discount rate 5%. Not
corrected for inflation. This figure would increase if victim were a child (although this
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IV. Cost of different vaccine strategies20
0
A. Narrow (at risk) strategy--46 total cases
1. Mild cases (11) $19,000
2. Moderate cases (24) $600,000
3. Severe cases (11) $11,200,000
4. TOTAL201  $11,819,000202
B. Broad (general) strategy-749 total cases
1. Mild cases (187) $327,000
2. Moderate cases (375) $9,377,000
3. Severe cases (187) $190,366,000
4. TOTAL $200,000,000
benefit would not become payable until the child turned 18), due to the additional years
of wages lost.
20 0Based on hypothetical injury victim from part Ill and population estimates from
Appendix A.
201Totals in this analysis do not include payment for pain and suffering or attorney's
fees.
202This figure could be lower if a small percentage of deaths occurred. For example,
assuming a 5% death rate (30 hospitalization days; $250,000 death benefit), and a
correspondingly lower 20% severe occurrence, the total cost would be approximately
$10.38 million, or 90% of that shown.
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